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A primary aim of mind-wandering research has been to understand its influence on task 
performance. While this research has typically highlighted the costs of mind wandering, a 
handful of studies have suggested that mind wandering may be beneficial in certain situations. 
Perhaps the most-touted benefit is that mind wandering during a creative-incubation interval 
facilitates creative thinking. This finding has played a critical role in the development of 
accounts of the adaptive value of mind wandering and its functional role, as well as potential 
mechanisms of mind wandering. Thus, a demonstration of the replicability of this important 
finding is warranted. Here, we attempted to conceptually replicate results of a highly cited 
laboratory-based experiment supporting this finding. However, across two studies (N = 443), we 
found no evidence for the claim that mind wandering during a creative-incubation interval 
facilitates a form of creativity associated with divergent thinking. We suggest that our failed 
conceptual replication stems from an inadequate characterization of mind wandering (task-
unrelated thought), and that there are good reasons to think that task-unrelated thought is 
unlikely to be causally related to creativity. Our results cast doubt on the claim that task-
unrelated thought during an incubation interval enhances divergent creativity while also offering 
some prescriptions for how future research might further elucidate the cognitive benefits of mind 
wandering. 
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“Don't think. Thinking is the enemy of creativity…You can't try to do things. 




What makes somebody or something creative? Typically, something—like an idea, 
product, or solution—is considered creative when it is new. The creative musician generates a 
unique combination of sounds, the creative chef discovers an original combination of flavors, 
and so on. But novelty isn’t everything: according to many, the invention must exhibit some 
value to somebody (Dietrich, 2019; Hennessey & Amabile, 2009; Kenett et al., 2020). After all, 
any hack can bang piano keys randomly or throw together random ingredients from their kitchen. 
What sets the musician or chef apart from the hack—true creativity—is the genesis of something 
that is both innovative and instrumental. 
 Different kinds of problem spaces require different kinds of creativity. Some problems 
have unique solutions, and in these spaces, the creative individual is one who can navigate the 
problem space to converge on this single solution. For example, the mathematician building a 
proof is searching for a single conclusion. This is a paradigmatic example of convergent 
creativity. Other problems require generating numerous potential solutions, and the creative 
individual is judged to be the one who can generate many unique solutions. For example, the 
screenwriter searching for new story ideas benefits from being able to flexibly generate a 
sizeable list of narratives. This exemplifies divergent creativity. 
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 Creativity is crucial for many of the unique and valuable endeavors we undertake. It’s 
important and often necessary for facilitating scientific, artistic, and political achievements that 
underscore the heights of human progress. But creativity also plays a role in mundane 
interactions, from improvising a recipe when lacking ingredients to maintaining engaging 
conversations over dinner. Creative people report experiencing better mood (Nadler et al., 2010), 
higher self-esteem (Barbot, 2018), and score higher on several dimensions of well-being (Conner 
et al., 2016). However, despite its demonstrated importance and benefits, much remains 
unknown about the cognitive mechanisms of creativity.  
 Anecdotal evidence about the mannerisms and discoveries of highly creative individuals 
provide some clues about the underlying processes supporting creative cognition. Many creative 
insights seem to occur in moments wherein the person is not actively focusing on generating a 
creative insight. Kekulé, for example, claims to have discovered the ring structure of the benzene 
molecule in a dream. The Indian mathematician Ramanujan was struck with numerous thoughts, 
the source of which he could not explain (so much so that he attributed his insights to a local 
Hindu goddess of good fortune; Cheng, 2017). Poincaré, Einstein, and Edison, among many 
others, all made similar claims. The collection of such anecdotal examples suggests an 
interesting phenomenon: setting a problem aside can lead to creative breakthroughs. This 
temporary disengagement is known as incubation, and there is a wealth of evidence to suggest 
that it is beneficial to creative thinking. For example, Gable et al. (2019) recently found that, 
when asked to report the creative quality and context of their most salient daily “aha” moments, 
physicists and writers exhibited a pattern of more frequently generating enlightening solutions 
during mind wandering relative to focused thinking. 
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 The idea that incubation is readily conducive to creativity invites the question of what 
cognitive modes might promote creativity during incubation. This is important to understand, as 
such cognitive modes might be crucial for facilitating or even enhancing creativity. One relevant 
mode seems to be mind wandering. Consider that during incubation, an individual is not fixated 
on a particular problem. Thus, when incubating, a person is able to disengage and undergo 
cognitive exploration. Mind wandering during such periods might be particularly beneficial to 
certain kinds of creativity. Divergent creativity in particular, which requires forming novel 
associations, might benefit from mind wandering, because mind wandering is associated with 
hippocampally-mediated episodic memory reactivation (Ellamil et al., 2016; McCormick et al., 
2018), which can lead to distinct contents being reactivated jointly in a novel context. This 
reactivation can thereby facilitate forming novel associations between contents that are less 
likely to form during periods of goal-directed thinking (Mills et al., 2018-a). Altogether, this 
implies that mind wandering during an incubation interval should enhance divergent creativity.  
 There is some correlational evidence for this relationship between mind wandering and 
divergent creativity. Recently, Yamaoka and Yukawa (2020) found a small but significant 
correlation between performance on a task that measures divergent creativity and self-reported 
susceptibility to mind wandering (as measured by the Japanese version of the Mind Wandering 
Questionnaire; Kajimura and Nomura, 2016). They also showed, using multiple linear 
regression, that scores on a divergent creativity task predicted trait mind wandering to a small 
degree, even after controlling for age, sex, self-reported depressive symptoms, and self-reported 
symptoms of schizotypal personality. Agnoli et al. (2018) identified significant positive 
correlations between scores on a divergent creativity task, trait susceptibility to deliberate mind 
wandering, and responses to the Creative Achievement Questionnaire. Finally, Tan et al. (2015) 
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found that participants who reported greater amounts of mind wandering during an incubation 
interval improved at a significantly greater rate on the number reduction task (a measure of both 
divergent and convergent creativity) relative to participants who reported less mind wandering. 
However, these results are correlational and, with the exception of Tan et al., rely on trait 
measures of mind wandering. 
 One influential study found experimental evidence for the predicted relationship between 
mind wandering and divergent creativity: Baird et al. (2012) examined performance on the 
Alternate Uses Task (AUT; a widely used measure of divergent creativity; Guilford, 1967) 
across several conditions following participants’ initial efforts to think of novel and creative uses 
for a common object (e.g., brick). These conditions included: (a) performing a demanding (2-
back) task, (b) performing a less-demanding (0-back) task, (c) having a period of rest, or (d) 
performing an immediate repetition of the AUT, with no intermediate activity. The authors 
hypothesized that mind wandering during an incubation interval would lead to greater divergent 
creativity. Based on this hypothesis, they predicted that participants in the less-demanding task 
would mind wander more and perform better on the AUT relative to other conditions. Consistent 
with their hypotheses, the less-demanding task was found to be associated with more mind 
wandering than the demanding task and, critically, the less-demanding task was also associated 
with greater subsequent production of additional creative ‘uses’ responses relative to other task 
conditions (demanding, rest, and immediate repetition). Thus, the authors concluded that mind 
wandering led to the discovery of new uses beyond those imagined in the first exposure.  
This finding represented a major advance in the study of both creativity and mind 
wandering (as evidenced by the 914 citations Baird et al.’s paper has garnered as of April 9, 
2021). On the creativity side, this presented a promising intervention to facilitate creative-idea 
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generation and possible cognitive mechanisms of certain kinds of creative cognition. For mind 
wandering, this finding provided evidence for conceptual accounts of the adaptive value 
(Sripada, 2018) and functional role (Shepherd, 2019) of mind wandering, and contributed to the 
development of novel frameworks of mind wandering (see Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). 
Smeekens and Kane (2016) conducted a series of conceptual replications of Baird et al. 
(2012). Across several multi-session studies measuring how working-memory capacity and other 
individual-differences variables affected mind wandering and creativity, Smeekens and Kane 
failed to find the expected significant relationships between mind wandering and AUT 
performance, despite utilizing various scoring procedures. In their Experiment 3 (the one 
modelled most closely on Baird et al.), they had participants perform the AUT, followed by an 
undemanding incubation-interval task, followed by a repeated AUT problem. Even here, 
Smeekens and Kane (2016) failed to find any relation between mind wandering during the 
incubation-interval and AUT scores. More recently, Steindorf et al. (forthcoming) conducted a 
conceptual replication of the results from Baird et al. and Smeekens and Kane. Participants 
completed both verbal and figural AUTs prior to a 12-min. incubation interval (0-back task). 
After the incubation interval, participants completed another round of the AUTs. Steindorf et al. 
also failed to find significant correlations between post-incubation AUT score and proportion of 
mind wandering. 
Notably, Leszczynski et al. (2017) found that mind wandering during an incubation 
interval positively correlates with improved scores on a creativity task. Participants completed 
the SART between iterations of the Compound Remote Associates Test (Mednick, 1962). In the 
latter, participants are given three words and asked to find the shared associate (e.g., “cottage--
Swiss--cake” would have “cheese” as its solution). Participants who reported more mind 
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wandering during the SART also produced more solutions in the second round of the task 
relative to those who reported less mind wandering. However, unlike Baird et al. (2012), 
Leszczynski et al. used a test of convergent creativity rather than divergent creativity. Hence, 
these results cannot be considered a close replication of Baird et al. 
In the interest of replication, we tested the hypothesis from Baird et al. (2012) that mind 
wandering during an incubation interval would improve divergent creativity by conducting a 
conceptual replication Our replication adopted three design features from Smeekens and Kane. 
First, we explicitly prompted participants to generate creative and useful responses to the AUT. 
Second, Baird et al. assessed AUT performance using uniqueness scores, where unique 
responses (relative to the entire set) are assigned a score of 1 (non-unique responses are assigned 
a score of 0). However, given criticisms of uniqueness scoring for measuring creativity (Silvia et 
al., 2008; Smeekens and Kane, 2016), we used subjective ratings of creativity generated by three 
independent raters (we also conducted exploratory analyses using alternative scoring systems to 
ensure that analyses were robust to different scoring procedures). Finally, we measured mind 
wandering using thought probes rather than a retrospective report. Baird et al. measured mind 
wandering with a single retrospective report collected at the end of the incubation-interval. 
However, this method is likely to be less reliable than in situ probes because accurately 
responding to a single retrospective measure requires significantly more working memory and 
recollection than accurately responding to a probe about where attention was directed over the 
previous few seconds. 
Our studies more closely conceptually replicates Baird et al. (2012) relative to Smeekens 
and Kane (2016) or Steindorf et al. (forthcoming) for several reasons. First, neither Smeekens 
and Kane nor Steindorf et al. manipulate proportions of mind wandering during the incubation 
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interval and measure for effects of this manipulation; instead, they used a incubation-difficulty 
condition looking at predictive relations between proportion of mind wandering during an 
undemanding incubation-interval task and AUT responses. In this experiment, we use a task-
difficulty manipulation from Baird et al. to manipulate proportions of mind wandering across 
conditions. Second, Smeekens and Kane did not measure the content of task-unrelated thoughts 
during the incubation-interval task. This is important, as thoughts about the AUT during the 
incubation interval would count as mind wandering according to the probes used by Smeekens 
and Kane because such thoughts are unrelated to the incubation interval task. However, such 
thoughts would not constitute incubation, as incubation about some non-focal task or problem 
precludes fixating on some task or problem. Neither of these are meant to indicate problems with 
Smeekens and Kane, as their studies examined more general relationships between executive 
control, working memory, and different forms of creativity, or Steindorf et al., who examined the 
role of different probing techniques on creative performance. Additionally, unlike either Baird et 
al. or Smeekens and Kane, we (a) collected data from a larger sample, (b) explicitly informed 
participants about the post-incubation AUT, which should encourage incubation effects, and; (c) 
used Bayesian analyses to supplement significance testing (these match aspects of the sampling, 
design, and analytic approach of Steindorf et al. (forthcoming)). 
 
Study 1 
Pre-registration of sample size, primary outcome measures, exclusion criteria, 
experimental materials (including experiment programs and stimuli), raw data, and analysis 
scripts can be found at https://osf.io/dwec2/. In accordance with the recommendations of 
Simmons et al. (2012), we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, and all 
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We recruited 200 participants (Mage = 40.24, SDage = 11.22, female = 104) through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We recruited only participants located in the United States with a 
HIT approval rate greater than or equal to 98% and at least 5000 previously approved HITs. We 
determined our target sample size based on the results of an a priori power analyses conducted in 
the G*Power 3.1.9.7 software (Faul et al., 2007) for independent-samples t-tests with a medium 
effect size (d = 0.40), standard two-tailed alpha value (p < .05) at 80% power. Per the criteria 
described in the pre-registration, we excluded data from 6 participants based on their self-
reported use of online resources while completing the AUT. We further excluded 8 participants 
who performed at chance or worse on the n-back (final N = 186).1 
Materials 
N-back Task. We induced differential proportions of mind wandering by implementing a 
between-groups n-back manipulation (Smallwood et al., 2011; Baird et al., 2012; Konishi et al., 
2015; Smeekens & Kane, 2016; Brosowsky et al., Forthcoming). In this paradigm, participants 
are asked to respond to target stimuli and withhold responses to non-target stimuli. The stimuli 
consisted of eight digits (1-8) presented serially on-screen, with target stimuli displayed in red 
and non-target stimuli displayed in black. In the 0-back condition, participants were asked to 
 
1 While this departs from our pre-registered exclusion criteria, none of our results change significantly when we 
included these 8 participants. 
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indicate whether the red digit was even or odd. In the 2-back condition, participants were asked 
to indicate whether the digit presented two trials prior to the red digit was even or odd. 
Participants completed 15 blocks of 16 trials (240 trials total). At the start of each trial, a 
fixation cross was presented in the center of the screen for 1500ms followed by a blank screen 
presented for 500ms. The target stimulus was displayed on screen for 1500ms followed by a 
blank screen for 500ms. If a response was not registered within the 1500ms window, the trial 
was counted as a miss. Participants completed one practice block containing 24 trials with 4 
target stimuli. If participants responded to a non-target (false alarm), they were instructed to 
withhold responses to non-targets. If participants did not respond or responded incorrectly to a 
target (miss), they were instructed to respond according to the instructions. Participants had to 
respond correctly to 3 out of 4 targets to move on to the experimental trials. Participants were not 
given feedback on performance in the experimental trials. Target stimuli were evenly split 
between even and odd, so that performance at chance would be 50%. The ratio of target to non-
target stimuli differed slightly between experimental and practice trials. There were 24 practice 
trials with 4 targets (1 target per 6 trials), while the experimental task had 240 trials with 30 
targets (1 target per 8 trials).  
Alternate Uses Task. The Alternate Uses Task (Guilford, 1967) is a prominent measure of 
divergent creativity (Plucker & Makel, 2010) that assesses individual ability to access 
semantically distant concepts relative to a mundane cue. Participants were provided the name of 
a single everyday object (“brick”) and asked to generate creative and unusual uses for the object. 
Three sample responses were provided. Additionally, participants were told to generate 
responses that are creative, useful, and specific to the object. 
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Thought Probes. At semirandom intervals, participants were presented with thought 
probes to assess the content of thought (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Weinstein, 2018). Probes 
were never presented immediately after a target stimulus. A thought-probe trial was presented 
once in every 16 trials (15 n-back trials/1 thought-probe trial), randomly presented between trials 
7 to 11. The minimum time between probes was 48 seconds and the maximum time between 
probes was 80 seconds (64-second intervals, on average). These probes inquired about what the 
participant was thinking about just prior to seeing the probe with three options: (1) thinking 
about the even/odd task; (2) thinking about the upcoming creativity task, and; (3) thinking about 
something unrelated to the experiment. The second option was included because participants 
were explicitly instructed about the AUT to be completed. Reaction times were recorded for each 
thought probe response. 
In keeping with the experimental procedures from Baird et al. (2012), we operationalized 
mind wandering in terms of task-unrelated thought. Thus, when participants reported either 
thinking about the upcoming creativity task or thinking about something unrelated to the 
experiment, these were recorded as mind wandering. This matches the procedures used in 
Smeekens & Kane (2016). However, because the hypothesis from Baird et al. is that mind 
wandering during an incubation interval improves AUT performance, we ran all analyses with a 
separate measure of mind wandering that included only the instances where participants reported 
thinking about something unrelated to the experiment. 
Procedure 
After reading instructions on the n-back task, AUT, and thought probes, participants 
practiced the n-back task and could not advance without responding correctly to three targets. 
Before beginning the experimental trials, participants were again told about completing the AUT 
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immediately after the n-back. Participants completed 15 minutes of n-back trials before doing the 
AUT for 2.5 minutes. A timer was visible for the AUT, indicating how much time was remaining 
(no timer was visible for the n-back task). 
Creativity Scoring 
Three raters (undergraduate research assistants trained in AUT scoring but blind to the 
hypotheses of the study and conditions) independently scored each participant’s individual 
responses on a scale of 1-5. To assign scores, raters were told to assess responses on their 
novelty and creativity and to exclude nonsense answers with the following scoring system (full 
instructions are available at https://osf.io/dwec2/): 1 = very obvious/ordinary use; 2 = somewhat 
obvious use; 3 = non-obvious use; 4 = somewhat imaginative use; 5 = very imaginative/re-
contextualized use; 99 = invalid (all invalid responses were excluded from final analyses). Raters 
exhibited strong reliability (α = 0.906). Creativity scores were calculated by taking the arithmetic 
mean of all three ratings. 
Results 
We supplemented null hypothesis significance tests with Bayes Factor analyses using the 
BayesFactor package in R with default settings (Morey & Rouder, 2018). To simplify 
interpretation, we report the Bayes Factor in the direction the data supports (BF01 when there is 
more evidence in favor of the null over alternative hypothesis and BF10 when there is more 
evidence in favor of the alternative over null hypothesis). Bayes Factors are interpreted 
according to the proposal from Jeffreys (1961), with BF > 3 indicating moderate evidence, BF > 
10 indicating strong evidence, BF > 100 indicating overwhelming evidence, and BF < 3 
indicating anecdotal evidence (see Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). 
Task difficulty manipulation 
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All descriptive statistics for Study 1 are reported in Table 1. To assess the effectiveness 
of the task difficulty manipulation, we compared performance and proportion of mind wandering 
across conditions. Based on Baird et al. (2012), we hypothesized that participants in the 0-back 
condition would perform better and mind wander more than participants in the 2-back condition. 
Performance was calculated as the proportion of correct responses to total responses. Participants 
in the 0-back condition performed significantly better (M = .91, SD = 0.09, n = 95) than 
participants in the 2-back (M = .81, SD = 0.13, n = 91) condition (tWelch(159) = 5.94, p < .001, d 
= 0.88, CI[0.57, 1.17), with overwhelming evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis over 
the null, BF10 > 100 (Figure 1).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Study 1 











M = .28(.26) M = 
2.53(0.39) 
MW (Overall): -.11 (p = .30) 
MW (Unrelated) -.09 (p = .41) 
2-back 





M = .11(.14) M = 
2.48(0.40) 
MW (Overall): -.11 (p = .28) 
MW (Unrelated): -.07 (p = .49) 
MW Overall = proportion of mind wandering calculated using all thoughts unrelated to the n-
back task. MW Unrelated = proportion of individual mind wandering calculated using thoughts 
unrelated to the n-back task or the AUT. AUT = average score per participants averaged across 
three independent ratings. Correlations = Spearman’s rank correlation between AUT score and 
different measures of mind wandering. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of correct responses between n-back conditions (0-back or 2-back) 
 
As expected, participants reported significantly more mind wandering in the 0-back (39% 
of thought probes) relative to the 2-back (18% of thought probes) condition (tWelch(157) = 5.59, p 
< .001, d = 0.81, CI[0.52, 1.11]), with overwhelming evidence in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis BF10 > 100 (Figure 2). When calculating mind wandering as thoughts that are 
unrelated either to the n-back task or upcoming AUT, participants in the 0-back group report 
significantly more mind wandering (28% of thought probes) relative to participants in the 2-back 
group (11% of thought probes) (tWelch(147) = 5.51, p < .001, d = 0.80, CI[0.51, 1.10]), with 
overwhelming evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis, BF10 > 100. Both performance and 
wind wandering measures resemble results found in other studies utilizing task difficulty 
manipulations to influence rates of mind wandering (Baird et al., 2011; Brosowsky et al., 
Forthcoming; Smeekens & Kane, 2016). 
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Figure 2. Proportion of mind wandering between n-back conditions (0-back or 2-back) 
 
The relationship between mind wandering and creativity 
To assess whether mind wandering is associated with AUT scores, we compared AUT 
performance across conditions. Participants in the 0-back group performed better on the AUT (M 
= 2.53, SD = 0.39) relative to participants in the 2-back group (M = 2.48, SD = 0.40), though an 
independent samples t-test indicated that this difference was not significant (t(184) = 0.82, p = 
.41, d = 0.12, CI[-0.17, 0.41]; see Figure 3). Bayesian analyses yielded modest evidence in favor 
of the null hypothesis BF01 = 4.59. 
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Figure 3. Average AUT scores (1-5) between n-back conditions (0-back and 2-back). 
 
We computed correlations between AUT performance and different thought probe 
responses. A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for average AUT scores indicated non-normal 
distribution (p  = .02), so we calculated Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. For participants 
in the 0-back group, there was no significant correlation between AUT performance and mind 
wandering calculated as either overall mind wandering (loge(S) = 11.97, p = .30, ρ = -.11, CI[-
.30, .10], BF01 = 4.34) or thoughts unrelated to the n-back or AUT (loge(S) = 11.95, p = .41, ρ = -
.09, CI[-.28, .12], BF01 = 3.57) (see Figure 4). We also found no significant correlation between 
AUT performance and mind wandering calculated as either overall mind wandering (loge(S) = 
11.85, p = .28, ρ = -.11, CI[-.31, .09]) or thoughts unrelated to the n-back or AUT (loge(S) = 
11.15, p = .49, ρ = -.07, CI[-.27, .14]) for participants in the 2-back group. Notably, we found 
only anecdotal evidence in favor of the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis that there 
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is a significant correlation between AUT performance and overall mind wandering (BF01 = 2.14) 
or thinking that is not about the n-back or AUT (BF01 = 1.90). 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between average AUT score and individual proportion of mind wandering 
(calculated as thoughts that are unrelated to the n-back or AUT). 
 
As in Baird et al. (2012), we split participants’ data according to whether they registered 
at least one AUT-related thought during the n-back task or not. In the 0-back condition, 50 
participants registered at least one AUT-related thought (45 participants registered none), 
whereas in the 2-back condition, 38 participants registered at least one AUT-related thought (53 
participants registered none). In the 0-back group, participants who did not think about the AUT 
at all performed better on it (M = 2.56, SD = .32) relative to participants who thought at least 
once about the AUT (M = 2.50, SD = .45). In the 2-back group, participants who did not think 
about the AUT performed slightly better on it (M = 2.48, SD = .43) relative to those who thought 
about the AUT (M = 2.47, SD = .36).  
A between-subjects ANOVA with n-back group and AUT-related thought as factors 
revealed no significant interaction between n-back group and AUT-related thought (F(1, 182) = 
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0.24, p = .63, ηp2 = .00), and no main effects of n-back group (F(1, 182) = .73, p = .39, ηp2 = .00) 
or AUT-related thought (F(1, 182) = 0.43, p = .51, ηp2 = .00) with moderate evidence for the null 
hypothesis over the hypothesis that there is an effect of AUT-related thoughts on AUT score 
(BF01 = 5.35).  
Exploratory Analyses 
Finally, for exploratory purposes, we used a recently developed automated AUT scoring 
program (SemDis; Beaty & Johnson, 2020) to assess whether the predicted effect of mind 
wandering on creativity obtains when using automated creativity scores. SemDis computes the 
semantic distance between the cue and the participant response relative to a semantic space. The 
program enables computing semantic distance within five different semantic spaces 
(cbowukwacsubtitle_nf_m, cbowsubtitle_nf_m, cbowBNCwikiukwac_nf_m, TASA_nf_m, and 
glove_nf_m). We chose to analyze responses using automated ratings indexed to each of the five 
semantic spaces, as well as a composite score based on all five sets of ratings (SemDis_MEAN). 
We first wanted to assess correlations between subjective ratings and automated ratings. Because 
subjective and automated ratings are generated on different scales, we first normalized both sets 
of ratings using MinMaxScaler with the scikit-learn package in Python. The default setting is to 
map values to a [0, 1] range. However, given the 1-5 scale used by raters, we adjusted the 
parameters to map all values onto a common [1, 5] range. After normalization, the internal 
reliability between average AUT scores across all SemDis dictionaries and manually coded AUT 
responses was strong (α = .90), We computed Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between 
manually coded AUT scores and automated AUT scores (see Figure 5). For most semantic 
spaces, we found moderate significant correlations between manually coded AUT scores and 
automated AUT scores. 
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Figure 5. Correlations between manual and automated AUT scores. Correlation coefficients are 
Spearman’s ρ, and boxes with an ‘×’ indicate p > .05 (p-values are corrected for multiple comparisons 
using Bonferroni correction). 
 
 
Independent-samples t-tests revealed no significant differences and moderate evidence for the 
null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis that there are significant differences in AUT 
scores by n-back group (see Table 3).  
 
Bayesian Independent Samples T-Test 
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  BF₀₁ error % 
SemDis_cbowukwacsubtitle_nf_m_avg  3.78  8.27e-6  
SemDis_cbowsubtitle_nf_m_avg  4.75  9.41e-6  
SemDis_cbowBNCwikiukwac_nf_m_avg  5.45  1.01e-5  
SemDis_TASA_nf_m_avg  4.62  9.26e-6  
SemDis_glove_nf_m_avg  6.18  1.08e-5  
SemDis_MEAN_avg  6.20  1.08e-5  
SemDis_factor_avg  5.84  1.05e-5  
Note. The alternative hypothesis is that AUT 
scores differ by n-back group. When the 
alternative hypothesis is changed to match the 
prediction from Baird et al. (2012) that AUT 
scores in the 0-back group are greater than AUT 
scores in the 2-back group, there is still moderate 
to strong evidence against the alternative 
hypothesis (all BF01 from 2.95 - 12.01). 
 Table 2. Bayesian independent samples t-test comparing automatically generated AUT scores by n-back group 
To test the robustness of our results against different scoring procedures, we further 
analyzed AUT responses through a second automated scoring package (Mildner, 2020). The 
software calculates four conceptually unique facets of creativity: (1) fluency, (2) elaboration, (3) 
flexibility, and (4) originality. The composite AUT score for this package is computed as the 
arithmetic mean of z-scored subscale scores. The first three subscales are determined using 
function calls from the SpaCy natural language processing (NLP) library in Python while the 
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originality index is evaluated by k-means clustering using the scikit-learn package in Python. To 
approximate semantic similarity for the flexibility subscale, a further bootstrapping analysis was 
conducted to correct for the disproportionately higher similarity scores to be expected for longer 
words in each response: for words of length n characters, 10,000 words with a corresponding 
length of n characters were randomly sampled from a vocabulary corpus from a trained SpaCy 
English NLP pipeline to compare against them for similarity. 
We first examined whether fluency scores differed by condition. Fluency is a measure of 
the number of items generated during the AUT. Participants in the 0-back group exhibited 
roughly equal fluency (M = 7.52, SD = 3.8) to participants in the 2-back group (M = 7.53, SD = 
4.0) (t(184) = -0.02, p = .98 d = -0.00, CI[-0.29, 0.29]), with moderate evidence for the null 
hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis that there is a difference in fluency scores across 
conditions, BF01 = 6.28. We also found no significant difference by condition for elaboration (p 
= .55, BF01 = 5.30), flexibility (p = .86, BF01 = 6.20), or originality scores (p = .98, BF01 = 6.28), 
with moderate evidence for the null hypotheses over the alternative hypotheses that there are 
significant differences by condition for these scores. 
To account for potential interactions with AUT-related thought, we conducted a series of 
between-subjects ANOVA with automatically generated fluency, elaboration, flexibility, and 
originality scores with n-back group and AUT-related thought as factors. There was no evidence 
for a significant interaction between n-back group and AUT-related thought for elaboration (F(1, 
182) = 0.19, p = .67, ηp2 = .00, BF01 = 33.63), flexibility (F(1, 182) = 2.34, p = .13, ηp2 = .01, 
BF01 = 39.19), originality (F(1, 182) = 0.13, p = .72, ηp2 = .00, BF01 = 4.70), and fluency (F(1, 
182) = 2.84, p = .09, ηp2 = .02, BF01 = 3.59), with moderate to very strong evidence for the null 
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hypotheses over the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant interaction of n-back group 
and AUT-related thought on automatically generated AUT scores.  
Discussion 
Study 1 attempted to replicate results reported in Baird et al. (2012) that an increased 
proportion of mind wandering during an incubation interval correlates with better AUT 
performance. We replicated the finding that task-difficulty manipulations modulate rates of mind 
wandering: harder tasks tend to elicit less overall mind wandering than easier tasks. However, 
unlike Baird et al., we did not find evidence for an effect of n-back group on AUT scores. 
Moreover, we did not find that individuals’ proportions of mind wandering (based on two 
different ways of calculating proportions of mind wandering) were significantly associated with 
their AUT scores.  
These results align with the failed conceptual replication reported in Smeekens and Kane 
(2016) and Steindorf et al. (forthcoming). However, the former did not measure the content of 
mind wandering during the incubation interval. Hence, Smeekens and Kane could not confirm 
that the n-back task functioned as an incubation period for the creativity task because they could 
not rule out participants explicitly thinking about the creativity task during the n-back. In this 
study, we split participants’ responses according to whether they thought of the subsequent AUT 
at all during the n-back task or not. This allowed us to remove people who might not have been 
incubating. Moreover, neither group manipulated rates of mind wandering to measure for effects 
on AUT performance. While our task-difficulty manipulation successfully modulated mind 
wandering, we found no evidence for an effect on AUT performance. 
Even after splitting the data among participants who thought about the AUT during the n-
back task, we did not find any significant relationships between mind wandering and AUT 
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performance in the undemanding condition. This might seem surprising in one of two directions, 
so it’s important to understand what this result indicates. On the one hand, isolating the people 
who did not think about the AUT at all during the n-back selects people for whom the n-back 
might function as an incubation interval. Thus, we should expect that isolating the potential 
incubators in the undemanding condition would generate the predicted effect of mind wandering 
on AUT performance. However, even after making these post-hoc distinctions, we did not find 
that individual proportion of mind wandering predicts subsequent AUT performance. On the 
other hand, it might seem surprising that people who report thinking about the AUT during the n-
back do not perform better on it relative to those who don’t. While this result appears surprising, 
it should be interpreted cautiously. We did not account for how much time one spent thinking 
about the AUT, so measure of AUT-related thought might not be fine-grained enough to reveal 
an effect of thinking on AUT performance. However, the number of AUT-related thoughts was 
so low that it seems unlikely that a more sophisticated tool would yield different results. 
Additionally, perseverative thinking might strengthen a narrow range of associations, resulting in 
constrained AUT responding. Thus, thinking more about the AUT likely might not facilitate 
better performance on it. 
 
Study 2 
Study 1 failed to replicate the effect of mind wandering during an incubation interval on AUT 
performance reported in Baird et al. (2012). However, our design differed from Baird et al. in a 
crucial respect, as participants did not complete an initial round of the AUT prior to the 
incubation interval. Without a pre-incubation task, there is nothing on which participants can 
incubate. In order to more closely replicate the design of Baird et al., we conducted another study 
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that included a pre-incubation AUT and a novel post-incubation AUT to compare post-




 We recruited 284 participants (Mage = 42.1, SDage = 12.5, female = 131) through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We used the same screening criteria from Study 1. Target sample 
size was determined with an a priori power analysis conducted with G*Power for a linear 
regression with 4 predictors with 95% power to detect a medium effect size (f 2 = 0.15) at a one-
tailed standard p-value threshold (< .05). The analysis indicated that 129 participants are needed 
per condition (258 total). We over-recruited by 10% to account for attrition and exclusions. Per 
the criteria described in the pre-registration, we excluded 27 participants based on either self-
reported use of outside resources when completing the AUT, not completing part of the 
experiment, not following instructions, or failing to perform better than chance (50%) on the n-
back (final N = 257). 
 Materials 
 All materials were the same as Study 1. 
 Procedure 
 After reading instructions on the n-back task, AUT, and thought probes, participants 
practiced the n-back task and could not advance without responding correctly to three targets. 
Before beginning the experiment, participants were prompted about completing another round of 
the AUT after the n-back task. 
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 Participants were randomly assigned to complete an initial AUT for 2 minutes with either 
‘marble’ or ‘balloon’ as the prompt. Participants were then randomly assigned to complete 12 
minutes of either 0- or 2-back trials. Afterward, two AUTs (2 minutes each) were presented in a 
random order: one repeat AUT from the beginning of the experiment and one novel AUT (either 
‘marble’ or ‘balloon’). A timer was visible during AUT problems, indicating how much time was 
remaining (no timer was visible for the n-back task). 
 Creativity scoring 
 We used the same scoring procedure from Study 1. Raters exhibited strong reliability for 
both AUT items (balloon: α = .80; marble: α = .86). AUT scores for each participant were 
calculated by taking the arithmetic mean of all three ratings. 
 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics for AUT scores are reported in Table 4. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for AUT scores in Study 2 







(n = 131) 
Balloon 
Marble  
M = 2.20(.48) 
M = 2.59(.44) 
M = 2.28(.55) 
M = 2.66(.49) 
M = 2.26(.45) 
M = 2.55(.47) 
2-back 




M = 2.30(.56) 
M = 2.54 (.48) 
M = 2.40(.57) 
M = 2.58(.55) 
M = 2.18(.49) 
M = 2.51(.50) 
 
 Task difficulty manipulation 
Descriptive statistics for task difficulty and mind wandering are reported in Table 5. To assess 
the effectiveness of the task difficulty manipulation, we compared performance and proportion 
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of mind wandering across conditions. Performance was calculated as the proportion of correct 
responses to total responses. Participants in the 0-back condition performed significantly better 
(M = .92, SD = .07, n = 131) than participants in the 2-back condition (M = .85, SD = .12, n = 
125) (tWelch(210) = 6.25, p < .001, d = .76) with overwhelming evidence in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that there is a difference in accuracy by n-back group over the null, BF10 > 
100 (Figure 6). 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for task difficulty and mind wandering in Study 2 














M = 2.48(.55) 
2-back 







M = 2.51(.56) 
MW Overall = proportion of mind wandering calculated using all thoughts unrelated to the n-
back task. MW Unrelated = proportion of individual mind wandering calculated using thoughts 
unrelated to the n-back task or the AUT. Post-incubation Repeat AUT = average score per 
participant averaged across three independent ratings and collapsed across prompts for the 
repeated post-incubation AUT problem. Correlations = Spearman’s rank correlation between 
post-incubation repeated AUT score and different measures of mind wandering. 
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Figure 6. N-back performance by condition. *** denotes significant difference between 
conditions (p < .001). 
 
 
Based on results from Study 1, we predicted that participants in the 0-back condition 
would report significantly more mind wandering than participants in the 2-back condition. To 
assess this prediction, we calculated the proportion of mind wandering in two ways. First, we 
calculated the overall proportion of mind wandering, which includes probe responses that 
indicate thinking either about the AUT or something unrelated to the n-back task. Second, we 
calculated the proportion of mind wandering only including probes that indicate thinking about 
something other than the n-back or AUT. According to overall proportion of mind wandering, 
participants reported significantly more mind wandering in the 0-back condition (44% of thought 
probes) relative to participants in the 2-back condition (13% of thought probes) (tWelch(208) = 
9.33, p < .001, d = 1.16) with overwhelming evidence in favor of the alternative, BF10 > 100. 
When isolating thoughts that are unrelated either to the n-back or the AUT, participants in the 0-
back condition still report significantly more mind wandering (32% of probes) relative to the 2-
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back condition (9% of probes) (tWelch(202) = 7.75, p < .001, d = 0.96), with overwhelming 
evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis, BF10 > 100 (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. The left panel shows proportions of mind wandering calculated as including thoughts about the AUT 
by condition. The right panel shows proportions of mind wandering calculated as including thoughts unrelated 
to either the n-back or AUT by condition. 
 
Both performance and mind wandering measures replicated the results from Study 1. 
 The relationship between mind wandering and AUT scores 
 To assess whether mind wandering during an incubation interval has an effect on AUT 
performance, we first conducted two ANCOVAs to assess effects of n-back group on post-
incubation AUT scores when controlling for pre-incubation AUT scores. Additionally, because 
the hypothesis from Baird et al. (2012) is that mind wandering during an incubation-interval 
facilitates improved AUT performance, we also added AUT-related thought as a factor. There 
was a significant effect of pre-incubation AUT score on post-incubation repeated AUT problems 
(F(1, 251) = 58.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .19). There was also a significant interaction between n-back 
group and AUT-related thought (F(1, 251) = 4.38, p = .04, ηp2 = .02. There was no main effect of 
AUT-related thought (F(1, 251) = 1.32, p = .25, ηp2 = .01) or n-back group (F(1, 251) = 0.46, p = 
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.50, ηp2 = .00). Correcting for multiple comparisons, we found no significant differences in post-
incubation AUT performance for repeated problems as a function of n-back group by AUT-
related thought (all p > .22). In the ANCOVA for post-incubation novel AUT problems, we 
again found a significant effect of pre-incubation AUT score (F(1, 251) = 16.47, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.06). There was no significant interaction between n-back group and AUT-related thought (F(1, 
251) = 0.34, p = .56, ηp2 = .00. There was no main effect of AUT-related thought (F(1, 251) = 
2.68, p = .47, ηp2 = .00) or n-back group (F(1, 251) = 0.46, p = .10, ηp2 = .01). 
We computed linear regressions to test models for predicting post-incubation AUT 
scores. A model for post-incubation repeated AUT problems that included pre-incubation AUT 
scores and overall mind wandering as covariates accounted for 18% of the variance in post-
incubation AUT scores (F(2, 253) = 27.6, p < .001, R2 = .18). However, overall mind wandering 
did not have significant partial effects in the model (β = 0.01, CI[-0.20, 0.21], p = .96), with 
moderate evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis that overall mind 
wandering has significant partial effects in the model (BF01 = 6.98). When the model included 
mind wandering that encompasses thoughts unrelated to the n-back or AUT, it accounted for 
18% of the variance in post-incubation AUT scores (F(2, 253) = 27.8, p < .001, R2 = .18) and 
mind wandering again did not have significant partial effects in the model (β = 0.07, CI[-0.17, 
0.30], p = .59), with moderate evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis 
that overall mind wandering has significant partial effects in the model (BF01 = 6.95). 
A model for post-incubation novel AUT problems that included pre-incubation AUT 
scores and overall mind wandering as covariates accounted for 7% of the variance in post-
incubation novel AUT scores (F(2, 253) = 9.28, p < .001, R2 = .07). However, overall mind 
wandering did not have significant partial effects in the model (β = 0.16, CI[-0.03, 0.35], p = 
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.10), with anecdotal evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis that overall 
mind wandering has significant partial effects in the model (BF01 = 2.91). When the model 
included mind wandering that encompasses thoughts unrelated to the n-back or AUT, it 
accounted for 7% of the variance in post-incubation AUT scores (F(2, 253) = 9.45, p < .001, R2 
= .07) and mind wandering again did not have significant partial effects in the model (β = 0.20, 
CI[-0.03, 0.43], p = .08), with anecdotal evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative 
hypothesis that overall mind wandering has significant partial effects in the model (BF01 = 2.20). 
Exploratory analyses 
To explore for possible effects using automated AUT scoring procedures, we analyzed 
responses using automated ratings indexed to each of the five semantic spaces available in 
SemDis using the same normalization procedure as Study 1. For ease of presentation, we report 
results of analyses using SemDis_MEAN, which incorporates all scores across the different 
SemDis dictionaries (see Beaty and Johnson, 2020). After normalization, manually coded pre-
incubation AUT scores and SemDis scores exhibited poor reliability (α = .15). However, we 
found a weak but significant correlation between manually coded pre-incubation AUT scores and 
SemDis scores (loge(S) = 14.60, p < .001, ρ = .22, CI[.10, .33], with overwhelming evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that there is a significant correlation between manual and automatically 
scored pre-incubation AUT responses, BF10 > 100. 
Manual and automatic scores of post-incubation AUT responses for repeated AUT 
problems exhibited low reliability (α = .11). However, we again found a weak but significant 
correlation between manually coded AUT scores and SemDis scores (loge(S) = 14.70, p = .03, ρ 
= .13, CI[.01, .25]), though there was anecdotal evidence for the null hypothesis over the 
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alternative hypothesis that there is a significant correlation between manual and automatically 
scored post-incubation AUT responses, BF01 = 2.24. 
We conducted the same analyses using the average SemDis score to measure for effects 
with an alternative scoring system. We first conducted ANCOVAs with post-incubation SemDis 
score on repeated AUT problems with n-back group and AUT-related thought as factors and 
controlling for pre-incubation SemDis AUT score. There was a significant effect of pre-
incubation SemDis AUT score on post-incubation SemDis score for repeated AUT problems 
(F(1, 251) = 6.39, p = .01, ηp2 = .03). There was no significant interaction between n-back group 
and AUT-related thought (F(1, 251) = 2.67, p = .10, ηp2 = .01. There was no main effect of AUT-
related thought (F(1, 251) = 0.01, p = .91, ηp2 = .00) or n-back group (F(1, 251) = 0.55, p = .46, 
ηp2 = .00). In the ANCOVA for post-incubation SemDis score on novel AUT problems, we again 
found a significant effect of pre-incubation SemDis AUT score (F(1, 251) = 4.32, p = .04, ηp2 = 
.02). There was no significant interaction between n-back group and AUT-related thought (F(1, 
251) = 0.33, p = .57, ηp2 = .00. There was no main effect of AUT-related thought (F(1, 251) = 
1.87, p = .17, ηp2 = .01) or n-back group (F(1, 251) = 0.73, p = .39, ηp2 = .00). 
We computed linear regressions to test models for predicting post-incubation SemDis 
AUT scores. A model for post-incubation SemDis scores for repeated AUT problems that 
included pre-incubation SemDis AUT scores and overall mind wandering as covariates 
accounted for 2% of the variance in post-incubation AUT scores (F(2, 253) = 3.16, p = .04, R2 = 
.02). However, overall mind wandering did not have significant partial effects in the model (β = 
0.00, CI[-0.04, 0.04], p = .95), with moderate evidence for the null hypothesis over the 
alternative hypothesis that overall mind wandering has significant partial effects in the model 
(BF01 = 7.12). When the model included mind wandering that encompasses thoughts unrelated to 
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the n-back or AUT, it accounted for 3% of the variance in post-incubation SemDis AUT scores 
for repeated problems (F(2, 253) = 3.30, p = .04, R2 = .03) and mind wandering again did not 
have significant partial effects in the model (β = 0.01, CI[-0.04, 0.06], p = .52), with moderate 
evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis that overall mind wandering has 
significant partial effects in the model (BF01 = 6.11). 
A model for post-incubation SemDis scores for novel AUT problems that included pre-
incubation SemDis AUT scores and overall mind wandering as covariates accounted for 3% of 
the variance in post-incubation SemDis scores for novel AUT problems (F(2, 253) = 4.28, p = 
.02, R2 = .03). However, overall mind wandering did not have significant partial effects in the 
model (β = -0.03, CI[-0.07, 0.02], p = .25), with moderate evidence for the null hypothesis over 
the alternative hypothesis that overall mind wandering has significant partial effects in the model 
(BF01 = 4.61). When the model included mind wandering that encompasses thoughts unrelated to 
the n-back or AUT, it accounted for 3% of the variance in post-incubation SmeDis AUT scores 
for novel problems (F(2, 253) = 4.28, p = .02, R2 = .03) and mind wandering again did not have 
significant partial effects in the model (β = -0.05, CI[-0.10, 0.00], p = .06), with anecdotal 
evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis that overall mind wandering has 
significant partial effects in the model (BF01 = 1.71). 
 
Discussion 
In Study 2, we more closely replicated the original methods of Baird et al. (2012). We 
replicated our main results from Study 1. We found that while a task difficulty manipulation 
influenced the proportion of mind wandering experienced during an incubation interval, there 
was no evidence of an effect of condition for repeated AUT problems. This was robust to 
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different scoring procedures. Notably, in our exploratory analyses, we found that automatically 
scored AUT responses were only weakly associated with manually scored AUT responses, yet 
we still failed to find an effect of condition on AUT performance for repeated problems. 
 
General Discussion 
The effects of incubation on creativity are well-known (see Gilhooly, 2016). Incubation 
requires that one refrain from fixating on a problem and, during incubation, there are reasons to 
think that mind wandering can facilitate creative insights. This seems especially plausible for 
problems that require divergent creativity, which require cognitive exploration and forming 
novel associations. As mentioned in the Introduction, mind wandering facilitates forming novel 
associations and pattern learning (see Sripada, 2016). Why, then, do we fail to find any effects of 
task-unrelated thought during incubation on divergent creativity? 
One issue concerns the theoretical operationalization of mind wandering as task-unrelated 
thought. Baird et al. (2012), following standard procedures in research on mind wandering, 
assessed mind wandering in terms of thoughts unrelated to a focal task. However, this category is 
too heterogeneous to function as a useful tool for measuring the kind of mind wandering that is 
likely beneficial, in some circumstances, for divergent creativity. Consider, for example, that the 
probes used by Baird et al. (and in our replication) rule in a wide range of thoughts as mind 
wandering. Someone might not be thinking about the n-back or AUT, but instead fixating on an 
upcoming test or recalling a stressful conversation with a loved one. This kind of fixation counts 
as mind wandering according to standard probes, but lacks the exploratory and unconstrained 
character that is characteristic of the kind of mind wandering that is likely beneficial for 
divergent creativity. The fact that task-unrelated thought encompasses both rumination (or 
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perseverative thinking) and unconstrained exploration makes the construct too unwieldy to 
reliably assess the relationship between mind wandering and divergent creativity. 
This heterogeneity problem ramifies into a more general issue that applies both to our 
replication and to the experiment in Baird et al. (2012). During the n-back task, some participants 
might be fixating on concrete mental contents or episodes. This would not constitute incubation, 
because incubation requires a release from fixation. Thus, the observation of task-unrelated 
thought is not thereby evidence that a person is incubating. However, if it were the case that task-
unrelated thoughts do not gravitate toward thinking about concrete mental episodes, then this 
would be good (though not definitive) evidence that the observation of task-unrelated thought 
indicates that a person is also incubating (holding fixed some other situational factors). In fact, 
though, a wealth of evidence indicates precisely the opposite: task-unrelated thought has a 
general prospective orientation and often takes planned behaviors as part of its content (Baird et 
al., 2011). Thus, the experience of task-unrelated thought is likely often incompatible with 
incubating, as thinking about planned behaviors is relatively fixated (see Irving, 2016). Thus, we 
have further reason to think that task-unrelated thought is not a good measure for assessing the 
relationship between mind wandering and divergent creativity. 
This is not to imply that there is no interesting relationship between mind wandering and 
divergent creativity. We are claiming only that different measures of mind wandering are likely 
required to assess this relationship. In particular, measures that assess the dynamics of mind 
wandering are better able to capture the kinds of mind wandering that are likely related to 
divergent creativity. One suggestion that follows from our results is that researchers should shift 
from using content-based measures of mind wandering to constraint-based measures of mind 
wandering (Mills et al., 2018-b, based on the framework articulated in Christoff et al., 2016). 
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These measures have recently been shown to assess mind wandering episodes that are neurally 
dissociable from task-unrelated thought (Kam et al., 2021), and better capture the kinds of mind 
wandering that likely facilitate divergent creativity (see Girn et al., 2020). 
Some have noted that the AUT might not be an adequate measure of divergent creativity 
(see Zeng et al., 2011). While there are legitimate issues surrounding the construct validity of the 
AUT, we believe our discussion extends beyond these familiar criticisms in two ways. First, it 
might be the case that AUT performance measures only a narrow dimension of divergent 
creativity. Even if this were the case, however, we would expect to find an effect of mind 
wandering on the dimension of divergent creativity that the AUT putatively measures. Insofar as 
we do not find these effects, we think our results raise concerns about the use of task-unrelated 
thought measures of mind wandering to assess divergent creativity in laboratory settings. 
Second, perhaps the AUT does not measure any facet of divergent creativity whatsoever. Though 
a possibility, our criticism raises a distinct issue: even with more valid measures of divergent 
creativity, there is reason to believe that task-unrelated thought measures of mind wandering are 
not useful for assessing the kinds of mind wandering that likely facilitate divergent creativity. 
As noted in the Introduction, the connection between mind wandering and creativity 
plays an important role in views about the functional role and adaptive value of mind wandering. 
Because the study from Baird et al. (2012) was the first to experimentally manipulate mind 
wandering to modulate creativity, it became a cornerstone of such theoretical accounts. Sripada 
(2018, p. 25), for instance, cites only Baird et al. (2012) to support his claim that mind wandering 
is an exploratory mode of cognition (see Shepherd, 2019). Because of this failed replication 
(coupled with Smeekens and Kane, 2016), must we cede that these theoretical accounts are 
misguided? 
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We think that conclusion would be too rash. However, we do think some of the 
conceptual and methodological limitations noted above call for a more nuanced approach to 
studying the effects of mind wandering on creativity. One important methodological change is to 
reconsider the kind of creative benefits mind wandering is likely to generate. Potential effects of 
mind wandering on creativity are likely to appear for problems with some personal relevance to 
the individual (see Klinger, 2013). Hence, studies of mind wandering and creativity might 
consider using the Personal Concerns Inventory (Cox & Klinger, 1988) to assess areas of 
concern where people might experience creative breakthroughs. Second, researchers should 
reconsider the temporal scale along which effects of mind wandering on creativity are likely to 
occur. For Baird et al. (2012), mind wandering was supposed to influence creativity on an 
impersonal word association task within 15 minutes. However, breakthroughs on personally 
relevant problems or issues might require hours, days, or even weeks to occur. Hence, rather than 
using impersonal tests of creativity over short time scales, we suggest understanding creativity 
applied to the personal concerns of individuals over longer timescales. For this reason, we find 
the methodology of Gable et al. (2019) exemplary. They used experience-sampling techniques to 
assess the context, phenomenology, and content of thought during creative breakthroughs and 
how these moments of creativity related to the overall project. While this study focused on the 
creative insights of professional scientists and writers, it is also possible to use experience-
sampling methods to assess the relationship between creativity, mind wandering, and everyday 
concerns. We see no reason to think that mind wandering plays a fundamentally different role in 
the psychic economy of academics than non-academics. 
The results presented here indicate that the experience of task-unrelated thought during 
an incubation interval is not associated with improved AUT performance. Ultimately, the failure 
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to replicate Baird et al. (2012), coupled with the failed replications reported in Smeekens and 
Kane (2016) and Reinsdorf et al. (forthcoming), indicate that the results should no longer be used 
to support theories of mind wandering or hypotheses about mind wandering. As indicated in the 
Discussion, this makes sense. There are good reasons to think that the standard characterization 
of mind wandering (task-unrelated thought) used by Baird et al. is unlikely to bear interesting 
relationships to divergent creativity. In this way, the failure to replicate is unsurprising.  
We should note some important limitations to the current research. We utilized a single 
measure (AUT performance) of one kind of creativity (divergent creativity) and a single measure 
(task-unrelated thought) of mind wandering. Different measures or different constructs might 
relate differentially to mind wandering, conceptualized either as task-unrelated thought or 
relatively unconstrained thinking. As noted in the Introduction, Leszcyzynski et al. (2017) found 
that task-unrelated thought during an incubation interval was associated with improved 
performance on a measure of convergent creativity. And Tan et al. (2015) found that task-
unrelated thought during an incubation interval positively correlated with improvement on a 
subsequent round of the number reduction task. Thus, different tasks that measure different kinds 
of creativity might yield different results. However, both studies should be interpreted carefully. 
Tan et al. did not manipulate task-unrelated thought, and their thought probes assessed thought in 
terms of drifting away from the focal task. This means that participants might have been 
prompted to report on the dynamic characteristics of mind wandering that we argue above are 
more useful for exploring the relationship between mind wandering and divergent creativity. 
Leszcyzynski et al. did not separately assess whether task-unrelated thought was related to the 
upcoming creativity task or not (in their Study 3, when they do measure for these different kinds 
of content, they do not compute separate measures of mind wandering that include or exclude 
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thoughts related to the upcoming creativity task). Hence, it is possible that participants who 
exhibit greater improvement on the Compound Remote Associates Test simply thought more 
about the upcoming task rather than incubating. In all, more work is needed to carefully assess 
different measures and tasks to determine more precisely the relationship between different kinds 
of mind wandering and different kinds of creativity. 
While alternative methods, outlined in the Discussion, might reveal interesting 
relationships between divergent creativity and mind wandering, that’s a matter of what evidence 
there might be, not what evidence there is. This point bears repeating. Since 2017, the failed 
replications in Smeekens and Kane (2016) have been cited 93 times. Meanwhile, Baird et al. 
have steadily increased their citation rate, garnering over half of their citations (537) since 2017. 
We hope that our efforts induce some restraint among researchers looking to use the results from 
Baird et al. 
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